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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Generally attorneys prefer not to dignify the personal 
attacks of opposing counsel with a response, choosing rather to 
allow the Court to sort truth from error, recognizing that such 
attacks are typically sorry and desperate substitutes for legal 
reason and argument. However, in this case the attacks made by 
counsel for defendants, Mr. Ferrari, are repeated so often and 
with such pointed rancor and malevolence as to demand a response 
in the clearest and strongest terms possible. 
In four different places over just the first thirteen pages 
of Respondent's Brief, Mr. Ferrari directly accuses plaintiff's 
counsel of lying to this Court. On page 2 he charges that 
plaintiff's brief "is replete with . . . misstatements of the 
record"; on page 8 he claims that "[n]early every significant 
factual statement in that Brief is untrue"; on page 12 he alleges 
"intentional misstatement"; and on page 13 he describes 
plaintiff's brief as "a collection of misstatements, 
misrepresentations and conjecture." If what Mr. Ferrari alleges 
is true, plaintiff's counsel should be brought to stand before 
the Bar. If those acrimonious charges are not true, Mr. Ferrari 
should be disciplined for his groundless personal attacks against 
fellow members of the Bar. 
In response to these charges, plaintiff's counsel personally 
and painstakingly reviewed each statement of fact challenged by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Mr. Ferrari and each citation to the record in support of those 
facts to verify the truthfulness of each statement and the 
accuracy of each citation. Having made that review, plaintiff's 
counsel here affirms the truthfulness and accuracy of those 
statements and citations. Each statement and citation stands 
correct as written, and needs no qualification or explanation. 
What is most interesting is that in the process of verifying 
the statements challenged by Mr. Ferrari, plaintiff's counsel 
found that many of Mr. Ferrari's statements and citations to the 
record are erroneous. For example, in the list of twenty-one 
facts listed by defendants to be "uncontroverted," several of the 
statements are either totally or partially disputed in the 
record, and five of the twenty-one are not supported by the 
listed citation to the record, e.g., numbers 2, 7, 13, 15, and 
16. In the following discussion of nine of plaintiff's factual 
allegations, statement number five is misrepresented, the 
response to number one quotes Mrs. Hardy out of context and 
contains an errant citation to the record, other responses are 
superficial or false, and numbers four and six also contain 
erroneous citations to the record. 
The three most obvious and significant false statements made 
by Mr. Ferrari are that (1) plaintiff did not submit the 
affidavits of Mark Ith and Jan Hardy until after judgment was 
entered (Respondents' Brief pp. 10, 30, 36); (2) Dr. Val Sundwall 
-2-
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was not Lynn Hardy's treating physician at the time of Lynn's 
1974 heart attack and therefore knew nothing of the heart attack 
(Respondents' Brief pp. 13, 23); and (3) Agent Rigby took no 
medical history information from Lynn Hardy and was not 
authorized to do so (Respondents' Brief pp. 29-30). The falsity 
of these statements is so clear from the record that Mr. 
Ferrari's persistance in making them is surprising. Number one 
is false because the challenged affidavits were attached to, 
submitted with, and discussed in plaintiff's Memorandum In 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment. (R. 992-
1015.) Number two is false because the Emergency Room Record of 
Cottonwood Hospital shows that Lynn was referred there by "V. 
Sundwall" (Appellant's Brief, Add. p. 38); Lynn's Admission 
Record to Cottonwood Hospital lists his physician as "Dr. Val 
Sundwall and David Sundwall" (FDE-1 p. 67); and the subsequent 
University Hospital Discharge Summary records that at the time of 
his heart attack Lynn "called his physician, Dr. Val Sundwall, 
who immediately hospitalized the patient at Cottonwood Hospital" 
(FDE-1 p. 57). And number three is false because Part 1 of the 
insurance application, which Agent Rigby admittedly completed and 
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signed in the Hardy home, does inquire into previous heart 
attacks and chest pain (Appellant's Brief, Add. p. 5). 1 
Thus, it is evident that counsel for defendants has no 
corner on truth and right, and that the resolution of truth on 
this appeal is best left to the Court, More importantlyf this 
dispute over the few facts discussed above is merely indicative 
and representative of several material factual issues in this 
case that made summary judgment inappropriate and justify a trial 
on the merits. 
,$ SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The central focus on this appeal is whether there is a 
material issue of fact entitling the plaintiff to a trial on the 
merits. Respondents' Brief fails to controvert the existance of 
several material issues precluding summary judgment. In factf 
that Brief merely highlights the degree of dispute on the facts 
in this case. Defendants argue that the lower court's "factual 
determination is entitled to great weight." (Respondents' Brief 
Evidently Mr. Ferrari has attempted to make use of the 
propaganda technique known as dysinformation, whereby one covers, 
or distracts attention from, or hopes to validate one's own false 
statements with groundless accusations that his opponent is 
lying. This technique is used effectively in the realms of 
political intrigue, for example, in 1983 when the Soviet Union 
attempted to validate its false denial of downing the Korean 
jetliner by accusing the United States of using it as a spy 
plane. How unfortunate that Mr. Ferrari would attempt to 
introduce such tactics into the processes of this Court. 
-4-
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pp. 13-14.) However, in truth, the lower court was not 
authorized to make a factual determination, and that 
determination is certainly entitled to no weight on appeal. In 
reviewing a summary judgment, this Court makes an independent 
review of the record employing the same standard as the trial 
court. The following argument reconfirms that there are material 
issues surrounding the misrepresentation defense and that 
Prudential is equitably estopped from obtaining rescission on 
that defense because of its own failure to act on known 
information and its discriminatory and bad faith handling of 
plaintiff's claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE RECORD AND ARGUMENTS REVEAL MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT 
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE DEFENSE OF 
MISREPRESENTATION. 
A. Section 31-19-8 
Defendants argue that under U.C.A. §31-19-8 the claimed 
omissions from the insurance application in this case were 
fraudulent and material as a matter of law. (Respondents' Brief 
p. 15.) As authority for that construction, defendants quote 
from Chadwick v. Beneficial Life Insurance Co., 56 Utah 480, 191 
P. 240 (1920), which was decided over forty years before section 
31-19-8 was enacted, and Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. 
Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 70, 448 P.2d 724 (1968), which does not 
construe or even mention section 31-19-8. Even if those cases 
-5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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( 
were relevantf they do not support defendants' proposition in 
this case. Those cases found fraud as a matter of law only 
because the insured's intent to deceive "stands in the record 
uncontroverted," which is a portion of the court's language 
defendants omitted from the quotation in their brief. See 
Chadwick, supra, 191 P. at 245? Johnson, supra, 448 P.2d at 
7 23. Even Gilmore v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 43 2 F. 
Supp. 35 (W.D. Va. 1977), the case on which defendants chiefly 
rely throughout their brief, granted rescission as a matter of 
law only because the evidence required for rescission was 
"uncon trover ted." _Id_. at 37. That case is further 
distinguishable because the Virginia rescission statute requires 
only that the answer was material and untrue; it does not require 
fraudulent intent, as does U.C.A. §31-19-8. Thus, the cases 
cited by defendants have no application when, as here, the 
evidence required for rescission is not uncontradicted. 
In arguing that section 31-19-8 permits findings of fraud 
and materiality as a matter of law without regard to conflicting 
evidence on the issues, defendants fail to mention the four 
2It should be noted that Gilmore has never been relied 
upon nor even cited by any other court in the nearly nine years 
since it was decided. The other non-Utah cases cited by 
defendants to support this argument were also decided on 
"uncontradicted evidence," or "inferred" fraudulent intent from 
the mere falsity of the answer, a proposition clearly inapposite 
in Utah. 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
principal cases construing that statute: Moore v. Prudential 
Insurance Co. of America,, 26 Utah 2d 430, 491 P.2d 227 (1971); 
Marks v. Continental Casualty Co., 19 Utah 2d 119, 427 P.2d 387 
(1967); Pritchett v. Equitable Life and Casualty Ins. Co., 18 
Utah 2d 279, 421 P.2d 943 (1966); and Wootton v. Combined 
Insurance Co. of America, 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724 (1964). 
Defendants do cite Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. 
Mardanlou,, 607 P.2d 291 (Utah 1980), the other case construing 
section 31-19-8; however, they cite it for a proposition for 
which it does not stand. (Respondents' Brief p. 15, n.l.) All 
five of these cases construe section 31-19-8 to require the 
showing of a false statement that is both material and made with 
intent to deceive; and more importantly, those cases hold that 
materiality and fraudulent intent are questions of fact 
exclusively for the fact-finder and may not be decided as a 
matter of law. This principle is reaffirmed in Fuller v. 
Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Utah 1985). See also 
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Willsey, 214 F.2d 729 
(10th Cir. 1954), and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Grow, 103 Utah 
285, 135 P.2d 120 (1943), construing predecessor misrepresenta-
tion statutes in an identical fashion, and Burnham v. Bankers 
Life & Casualty Co., 24 Utah 2d 277, 470 P.2d 261 (1970), revers-
ing summary judgment for the insurer because of factual disputes 
on the issues of intent to deceive and materiality. Chadwick and 
Johnson, supra, cited by defendants, are not to the contrary. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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B. Material Issues of Fact 
As discussed and demonstrated in detail in plaintiff's 
principal brief, the record in this case reveals several issues 
of material fact precluding summary judgment for defendants on 
the misrepresentation defense. Merely to summarize, the general 
issues are: (1) whether, in view of Lynn's disclosure of the 
prior heart attack to Agent Rigby, there is a misrepresentation 
at all (Appellant's Brief pp. 13-18); (2) whether, in view of the 
disclosures to Agent Rigby; Lynn's apparent belief that he was in 
good health; and potential errors by Prudential examiners in 
asking the questions and recording the responses, Lynn intended 
to deceive Prudential (Appellant's Brief pp. 19-24);3 (3) 
whether, considering that Prudential still would have issued the 
policy; Prudential disregards medical history beyond five years 
old; and Prudential waived a rating of the policy on the basis of 
the adverse information it did have, the claimed 
misrepresentation was material (Appellant's Brief pp. 24-31); (4) 
whether Prudential is equitably estopped from asserting the 
misrepresentation defense on the grounds that it was "on-notice" 
to conduct a further inquiry that reasonably would have revealed 
the omitted information and it failed to do so (Appellant's Brief 
^As to this issue, see also New York Life Ins. Co. v. 
Grow, 103 Utah 285, 135 P.2d 120 (1943), not cited in plaintiff's 
principal brief. 
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pp. 33-45); and (5) whether Prudential is precluded from 
obtaining rescission by its own discriminatory and bad faith 
handling of plaintiff's claim (Appellant's Brief pp. 46-50). 
Those five general issues also implicate several specific 
subissues of fact, for example (1) whether Lynn disclosed the 
heart problem to Agent Rigby (Appellant's Brief pp. 3, 14); (2) 
whether Agent Rigby told Lynn to omit the information from Part 
II of the application because Prudential disregards medical 
history beyond five years old (Appellant's Brief pp. 3, 15); (3) 
whether Agent Rigby had actual or apparent authority to explain 
the scope of the application and whether Lynn reasonably relied 
on Rigby's explanation (Appellant's Brief pp. 17-20); (4) whether 
Prudential has a rule of disregarding medical history beyond five 
years old (Appellant's Brief pp. 15, 26-27); (5) whether Lynn 
regarded himself to be in good health at the time of the 
application (Appellant's Brief pp. 20-22, 32); (6) whether 
Prudential knowingly waived a rating of the policy for business 
and competitive reasons (Appellant's Brief pp. 26-30); (7) 
whether Prudential possessed known sources of the omitted 
information (Appellant's Brief pp. 36-37); (8) whether the 
medical information Prudential did have put Prudential "on 
notice" to consult the available sources (Appellant's Brief pp. 
37-45); (9) whether Prudential unfairly discriminated against 
plaintiff in denying the proceeds due under the policy 
-9-
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(Appellant's Brief p. 46); and (10) whether Prudential denied the 
claim in bad faith (Appellant's Brief pp. 47-49). The existance 
of these material issues demonstrates clearly the error of 
granting summary judgment in this case. The lower court erred in 
resolving these issues without a trial. * 
Defendants' only response to the many issues listed above is 
that plaintiff's factual contentions are "wholly implausible" and 
her supporting affidavits are "belated and obviously 
contrived." (Respondents' Brief p. 36.) Thus, defendants would 
have this Court, as did the trial court, assume the role of the 
jury in passing on the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight of the evidence in this case. That response epitomizes 
the position of the defendants in this case. They would prefer 
to settle the factual disputes on the face of the documents, 
without a jury, a position clearly contrary to the well-settled 
law entitling plaintiff to a jury trial. Utah Const, art. I, 
§10; U.C.A. §78-21-2; International Harvester Credit Corp. v. 
Pioneer Tractor and Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981). 
Contrary to the position espoused by defendants, summary judgment 
is proper only if a jury could not possibly find for the non-
moving party under any state of facts that could possibly be 
presented at trial. (Appellant's Brief p. 12, n.4.) Viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, no such 
state of facts exists in this case. A jury could reasonably 
-10-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
believe plaintiff's factual contentions; therefore, the summary 
judgment must be reversed. J 
C. Challenges to the Record 
Defendants attempt to remove certain factual disputes by 
arguing that plaintiff's three affidavits were untimely. As for 
the affidavits of Mark Ith and Jan Hardy, their timeliness is 
established above at page 3. The Affidavit of Dr. Joseph L. 
Thorne was submitted in support of plaintiff's Motion to 
Reconsider, filed after announcement of the trial court's initial 
decision, but before final judgment was entered on defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court clearly considered 
this additional affidavit in rendering judgment because the 
court's final judgment was not entered until after the hearing 
on, and resolution of, the Motion to Reconsider. (R. 1041, 1046, 
1146, 1143.) Since the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Thorne was 
submitted to the court prior to entry of final judgment and was 
considered by the court in rendering its final decision, the 
affidavit is properly part of the record on appeal from the 
-11-
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( 
summary judgment and may serve as the basis for reversing that 
judgment. Davis v. Riley, 20 Utah 2d 325, 437 P.2d 453 (1968).4 
POINT II: DEFENDANTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED NO VALID BASIS FOR 
DEPARTURE FROM THE RULE IMPUTING AGENT RIGBY'S 
KNOWLEDGE TO PRUDENTIAL. 
Defendants wisely concede that "there are many cases in 
which an agent1s knowledge about an omitted item of medical 
history has been imputed to his insurance company." (Respondents' 
Brief p. 29.) Defendants try to circumvent that rule by arguing 
first that it applies only when the disclosure is to an agent who 
is taking the medical history. That supposed distinction makes 
no difference in this case because Agent Rigby did question Lynn 
about a prior heart attack or chest pain in completing Part 1 of 
defendants argue elsewhere that evidence supporting 
the Motion to Reconsider is not part of the record on appeal 
because no separate notice of appeal from disposition of the 
motion was filed. (Respondents1 Brief p. 2.) However, no 
separate notice of appeal was filed because there was no separate 
final judgment from which to appeal. As in Davis v. Riley, 
supra, the Motion to Reconsider merely appealed to the court's 
discretion for a second or supplemental hearing on defendants' 
motion for summary judgment prior to entry of final judgment. 
Thus, the supplemental proceeding was a continuation and part of 
the proceedings on the motion for summary judgment. The trial 
court's action on the Motion to Reconsider is consistent with 
this understanding. The court did not deny the Motion to 
Reconsider; rather, he did reconsider the matter and examined the 
additional memoranda, but decided to reaffirm his initial 
decision. (R. 1146.) Even if the court's action on the Motion 
to Reconsider were considered a separate, appealable order, the 
language of the Notice of Appeal would include that ruling as 
well as the final judgment because both were signed on the same 
day. (Id.) 
-12-
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the application. (Appellant's Brief, Add. p. 5.) Thus, Agent 
Rigby was authorized to receive information on at least that 
portion of Lynn's medical history. (Rigby Dep. pp. 15-16, 30, 
48-49.)5 
Even if Agent Rigby, as Prudential's selling agent, were not 
specifically authorized to receive medical information, his 
knowledge of the prior heart attack would still be imputed to 
Prudential because (1) information regarding the prior heart 
attack was relevant to sale of the insurance and thus relevant to 
matters entrusted to Rigby; and (2) Rigby had apparent authority 
to receive such information on behalf of Prudential and to convey 
it to Prudential as he deemed necessary. This does not mean that 
"every bit of information known by every employee of a large 
organization [is] imputed to that organization." (Respondents' 
Brief p. 30.) In the insurance context it means only that 
disclosures to an agent, which are relevant to insurability and 
which the agent has apparent authority to receive, are imputed to 
the insurer. Case law supports this view and ignores the 
artificial distinction urged by defendants. E.g., Major Oil 
Corp. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 457 F.2d 596, 599 
DAgent Rigby also took a complete medical history of 
Lynn Hardy two months before the life insurance application when 
Lynn and his trucking employees applied for group health 
insurance. (FDE-1 p. 271; Rigby Dep. pp. 17-19, 35-36.) 
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(10th Cir. 1973) (Utah law); Northern National Life Ins, Co. v. 
Lacy J. Miller Machine Co., 305 S.E.2d 568, 570, 571-72 (N.C. 
App. 1983); National Life Assurance Co. v. Neves, 370 S.W.2d 144, 
146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Johnson v. Life Insurance Co. of 
Georgia, 52 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1951).6 
POINT III: THE 'NON-WAIVER' TERMS IN THE INSURANCE CONTRACT ARE 
UNENFORCEABLE TO VITIATE LYNN HARDY'S RELIANCE ON 
AGENT RIGBY'S INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE SCOPE OF THE 
APPLICATION. 
Defendants argue that Lynn was not justified in relying on 
Agent Rigby's representation that medical history beyond five 
years old need not be disclosed on the application because that 
representation would "alter" the terms of the insurance contract 
and the contract contains provisions prohibiting such 
alterations. (Respondents' Brief pp. 31-32.) This argument has 
no merit. To begin with, the record is not clear that by this 
instruction Agent Rigby was "altering" the terms of the 
contract. To the contrary, the record shows that Prudential does 
have, and frequently applies, this five-year rule. (Appellant's 
Brief pp. 15-16, 26.) 
Even if Agent Rigby's explanation of the five-year rule were 
considered an alteration of the contract, the contract provisions 
bSee also 44 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance §§1282-83 (1982): 
"An applicant for insurance may assume that an insurance company 
issues his policy with knowledge of facts communicated in good 
faith to the agent." 
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cited by defendants could not be invoked to disclaim that 
alteration. Such fine-print, boilerplate provisions are 
generally held unenforceable, as Prudential admits in its own 
claims manual: 
Even though our policies and applications contain text 
to the effect that no agent has the right to modify the 
contract, or to pass on insurability, or waive any 
rights or requirements, the courts are generally 
reluctant to enforce such language and, in the absence 
of actual collusion, would generally impute any 
knowledge of the agent to the Company under the law of 
Agency . . . •[FDE-2 p. 18, emphasis added.] 
Case law confirms this statement of the claims manual. 
Nearly all courts recognize that a potential insured is justified 
in relying on the representations and instructions of the 
insurance agent if the agent has actual or apparent authority to 
make those representations and the insured has no actual 
knowledge to the contrary. 44 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance §§1579, 
1603, 1607 (1982). The non-waiver provisions, such as those 
relied upon by defendants, are cleverly drafted attempts by 
insurance companies to circumvent that general rule. Courts 
typically respond by holding that insurers are estopped to invoke 
those provisions if the insured reasonably relied upon the 
agent's representations to the contrary. E.g., Darner Motor 
Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 
682 P.2d 388, 395, 400-01 (1984). In short, the principles of 
agency still prevail over the boilerplate non-waiver 
provisions. Paulson v. Western Life Ins. Co., 292 Or. 38, 636 
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P.2d 935, 948 (1981) ("neither the policy nor the application can 
limit the existing agency relationship"); Lewis v. Continental 
Life & Ace. Co,y 93 Idaho 348, 461 P.2d 243, 250 (1969) ("the 
I 
equitable device of estoppel may not be thwarted by a provision 
in a policy drafted by the party to be estopped"); Service v. 
Pyramid Life Ins. Co,, 201 Kan. 196, 440 P.2d 944, 954 (1968) 
i 
(agent of insurer can modify contract or waive conditions of 
policy despite printed language to the contrary). 
Whether the agent had actual or apparent authority to make 
i 
the representation and whether the insured's reliance on the 
agent's representation was reasonable are questions of fact for 
trial. E.g., Foster v. Johnstone, 107 Idaho 61, 685 P.2d 802, 
— a .
 ( 
808-09 (1984). In t h i s case , a jury could reasonably find tha t 
Agent Rigby had apparent au thor i ty to explain the scope of the 
insurance app l ica t ion in terms of the f ive-year r u l e , and tha t 
Lynn reasonably r e l i ed upon tha t explanation in completing the 
a p p l i c a t i o n . (See cases and a u t h o r i t i e s in Appe l l an t ' s Brief pp. 
17-18, e spec ia l ly Central National Life Insurance Co. v. . 
Peterson, 23 Ariz . App. 4, 529 P.2d 1213 (1975), holding tha t 
insurer was estopped to deny agen t ' s r epresen ta t ion tha t 
i 
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application went back only five years.) Thusf the lower court 
erred in resolving these issues without trial.' 
POINT IV: DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE DO 
NOT REFUTE PLAINTIFFfS ARGUMENT THAT PRUDENTIAL IS 
EQUITABLY ESTOPPED TO RAISE THE MISREPRESENTATION 
DEFENSE. 
Plaintiff maintains that Prudential is equitably estopped to 
assert the defense of misrepresentation because it was "on 
notice" to conduct a further inquiry that reasonably would have 
revealed the omitted medical history and Prudential failed to do 
so. (Appellant's Brief pp. 33-35.) Defendants attempt to refute 
that claim by arguing that contributory negligence is not a 
defense to fraud. (Respondents' Brief p. 18.) That argument 
intentionally misses the point. Plaintiff's counter-defense is 
not contributory negligence, but equitable estoppel. Plaintiff 
does not claim that Prudential, by its failure to conduct a 
further inquiry after it was "on notice" to do so, breached a 
duty owed to the insured; but rather that Prudential is equitably 
estopped to benefit from its own inaction when further action was 
indicated. This rule is not a novel one, but is well-supported 
in the case law. 
defendants also cite U.C.A. §31-19-26 to support their 
non-waiver provisions, but that statute has no application in 
this context. Moreover, even if relevant, it would have to be 
read in conjunction with sections 31-19-6(2) and 31-27-9(1), 
which render an insurer liable for the "alterations" or 
"misrepresentations" of its agents. 
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i 
Thus, defendants1 so-called Johnson-Holdsworth-Kohler rule 
has no application to this case. Moreover, in both Johnson v. 
Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d 134 (1945), and Kohler v. Garden 
i 
City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981), this Court concluded that the 
claims of fraud were defeated by the claimant's access to, or 
knowledge of, the truth. Even if there were such a rule (i.e., 
i 
t ha t mere negligence in ascer ta in ing the t r u th cannot defeat a 
claim of f raud) , i t would have no app l ica t ion in the insurance 
contex t , where the law does impose on i n s u r e r ' s the duty to 
i 
reasonably inves t iga te the i n s u r a b i l i t y of t he i r insureds p r io r 
to issuing the po l i cy . E . g . , State Farm Mutual Auto. In s . Co. v. 
Wood, 25 Utah 2d 427, 483 P.2d 892 (1971). The reason is t ha t 
i 
insureds rely upon insurers to cover insured losses in time of 
need. It would be patently inequitable, and would defeat the 
whole purpose of insurance, to permit an insurer to "blind itself 
from ascertaining the truth and then claim wilful misrepresenta-
l tion of the truth on which it relied in order to avoid payment 
under a policy." Wootton v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 16 
Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724, 726 (1964). For by then it is too late 
to obtain other insurance and the loss is left uncovered. Thus, 
the proper rule in this case is equitable estoppel, and the ^ 
discussion of that rule in plaintiff's principal brief 
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demonstrates tha t a jury could reasonably apply i t here to defeat 
o 
P r u d e n t i a l ' s claim of mis represen ta t ion . 
The essence of defendants1 remaining "contr ibutory 
negligence" argument i s an attempt to show that Prudential acted 
reasonably in f a i l i ng to pursue the known medical l e ads . This 
issue i s c l ea r ly disputed in the record and should be resolved by 
a ju ry . (Appel lan t ' s Brief pp. 36-45.) Defendants argue g l i b l y 
with respect to Lynn's known family h i s to ry of heart d isease and 
ea r ly dea ths , t ha t he was simply "a healthy man with some 
unhealthy r e l a t i v e s . " (Respondents' Brief p. 23.) However, the 
s t a r t l i n g f a c t s , which Prudent ia l knew pr io r to issuing the 
pol icy , are tha t his father and two brothers had already died of 
hear t d i sease , a th i rd brother also had heart d i sease , his mother 
died young of a s t roke , another brother died of su i c ide , and 
three other bro thers and a s i s t e r died at b i r t h . (Appel lan t ' s 
Brief pp. 36-37.) Those fac ts alone should have caught the 
t ra ined eyes of P r u d e n t i a l ' s medical examiners and 
underwr i te rs . When considered in connection with the other 
ind ica t ions of poss ib le hear t d i s ea se , such as the heart block 
and the l i f e - t ime smoking hab i t , Prudential c l ea r ly possessed 
s i gn i f i c an t ind ica t ions of hear t problems. (Affidavit of Dr. 
° I t should be noted tha t defendants make no attempt to 
quest ion, or even d i s cus s , the con t ro l l ing cases on equi tab le 
estoppel c i ted in Appel lan t ' s Brief pp. 33-43. 
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T h o r n e , 118, A p p e l l a n t ' s B r i e f , Add. p . 5 5 . ) C o n s i d e r i n g t h o s e 
known i n d i c a t i o n s , a j u r y c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y r e j e c t Dr . Wray 1 s 
t e s t i m o n y t h a t Lynn m a n i f e s t e d "no symptoms" of h e a r t t r o u b l e . 
( R e s p o n d e n t s 1 B r i e f p . 2 1 . ) 
C o n c e r n i n g t h e a v a i l a b l e s o u r c e s of i n f o r m a t i o n , d e f e n d a n t s 
a r g u e t h a t Dr. Val S u n d w a l l , who was l i s t e d on t h e a p p l i c a t i o n , 
knew n o t h i n g of L y n n ' s h e a r t a t t a c k and was m e n t i o n e d o n l y i n 
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a p r o s t a t e i n f e c t i o n a t Cot tonwood H o s p i t a l . As 
shown above on page 3 , Dr . Val S u n d w a l l was t h e f i r s t d o c t o r t o 
know of t h e h e a r t a t t a c k ; he was L y n n ' s f a m i l y p h y s i c i a n . 
M o r e o v e r , t h e c a s e s ho ld t h a t when t h e i n s u r e r i s "on n o t i c e " t o 
c o n d u c t a f u r t h e r i n q u i r y , known t r e a t i n g p h y s i c i a n s s h o u l d be 
c o n s u l t e d , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e who had t r e a t e d t h e i n s u r e d f o r 
a i l m e n t s o t h e r t h a n t h e one s u s p e c t e d . E . g . , R u t h e r f o r d v . 
P r u d e n t i a l I n s . Co. o f A m e r i c a , 44 Ca l R p t r . 6 9 7 , 704-07 ( C a l . 
App. 1 9 6 5 ) ; s e e a l s o A p p e l l a n t ' s B r i e f p . 4 2 . 
In sum, m a t e r i a l f a c t u a l d i s p u t e s e x i s t a s t o w h e t h e r 
P r u d e n t i a l was "on n o t i c e " and w h e t h e r i t s f a i l u r e t o c h e c k known 
s o u r c e s of m e d i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n was r e a s o n a b l e . 
POINT V: DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO JUSTIFY THEIR DISCRIMINATORY 
AND BAD FAITH HANDLING OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM. 
As d e m o n s t r a t e d in A p p e l l a n t ' s B r i e f p p . 4 6 - 4 7 , P r u d e n t i a l 
h a s u n f a i r l y d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f in f i v e 
d i f f e r e n t ways in h a n d l i n g and d e n y i n g h e r c l a i m , i n v i o l a t i o n of 
t h e U t a h I n s u r a n c e Code . D e f e n d a n t s r e s p o n d d i r e c t l y o n l y t o t h e 
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discriminatory deviation from Prudential's five-year rule by 
citing one other case in which medical history beyond five years 
old was used to deny a claim. (Respondents' Brief p. 26.) 
However, in that case there is no indication that the insured was 
told of the five-year rule and that he need not disclose the old 
history, as in this case. ^ Defendants otherwise do not deny 
that Prudential deviated from its claims practices in other 
similar cases in its handling of plaintiff's claim. Prudential's 
only response is that it has no obligation to treat all similarly 
situated claimants alike and that it is free to enforce its 
contract rights in some cases while not in other similar cases. 
(Respondents' Brief pp. 26-27.) This admitted arbitrary and 
capricious handling of insurance claims is precisely the type of 
unfair and discriminatory conduct prohibited by the Insurance 
Code. (See U.C.A. §§31-27-1, -22, and -24; Appellant's Brief, 
Add. p. 63. ) 1 0 
^Defendants refer, without citation to the record, to a 
"1979 angina pectoris" Lynn supposedly suffered. This is not 
true and was one of the misrepresentations plaintiff sought to 
correct on the Motion to Reconsider. (R. 1050, 1081.) 
,uPrudential also argues that by handling certain 
claims one way it does not "waive" its "right" to handle similar 
claims another way. (Respondents' Brief pp. 27-28.) Waiver of a 
right is immaterial here; the point is, there is no such right to 
unfairly discriminate. The Insurance Code denies that right 
altogether; therefore, it does not exist to be waived. 
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Defendants argue that the claims histories from similar 
cases that plaintiff culled from Prudential's files and used to 
establish unfair and discriminatory handling of plaintiff's claim 
cannot be offered in evidence. (Respondents' Brief p. 13.) It 
is understandable why defendants want to exclude this damaging 
evidence; howeverf the trial court ordered the production of 
those files (R. 174, 181, 622, 660), and those files were cited, 
quoted, and discussed by plaintiff in opposing defendants' 
motions for summary judgment (R. 992-1010). Therefore, they are 
properly part of the record. See Colonial Life & Accident Ins. 
Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 785, 647 P.2d 86 (1982). 
Relevant portions of the files are also reproduced in the 
Addendum to Appellant's Brief, pp. 77-93. 
Regarding the claim of bad faith conduct by Prudential, 
defendants merely argue that "[n]othing in the record could 
support [the] claim." (Respondents' Brief p. 33.) However, 
defendants make no attempt to explain or justify the many 
examples of Prudential's bad faith conduct listed in Appellant's 
Brief at pp. 48-49. The cases cited there hold that the entire 
course of dealings between the parties, from application to 
denial of the claim, is relevant to the question of bad faith. 
The recent case of Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 
795 (Utah 1985), confirms that an insurer's duty of good faith to 
its insured is recognized in Utah and that "at the very least," 
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i t requires the insured "to refrain from actions that will injure 
the insured's ab i l i ty to obtain the benefits of the contract." 
Id. at 801. In this case, as in Beckf the Court "cannot say that 
a jury could not find that [Prudential] breached i t s duty of good 
fai th." Jx[. at 802. Therefore, the matter should be remanded 
for t r i a l . 
Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff cannot rely upon 
Prudential's statutory violations as evidence of discriminatory 
and bad faith conduct because Chapter 27 of the Insurance Code 
does not contemplate a private right of action. (Respondents1 
Brief p. 34.) This argument has no merit. While Chapter 27 does 
not expressly provide for private enforcement, neither is it 
expressly precluded. In fact, private as well as public 
enforcement of the unfair claims practices provisions of the 
Insurance Code is consistent with the purposes sought to be 
achieved by those provisions. This Court in Beck, supra, 
recognized that fact, stating: 
[U]nder various unfair practices acts, there may be 
statutory requirements that give rise to independent 
causes of action. E.g. , U.C.A., 1953, §§31-27-1 to 
-24. [701 P.2d at 800, n.3.] 
The only case cited by defendants to support a contrary 
proposition is Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 
1974), which does not deal with the Insurance Code. That case 
was expressly limited to its facts in FMA Acceptance Co. v. 
Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979), which did 
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recognize a private action under a different section of the 
Insurance Code. See also Equitable Life Assur. Society v. 
Walkenhorst, 20 Utah 2d 124, 434 P.2d 304 (1967) (private action 
under Chapter 27 of Insurance Code.) 
Thus, a jury could reasonably find that Prudential has 
engaged in discriminatory, unfair, bad faith conduct, in 
violation of the Utah Insurance Code. Such a finding would bar 
Prudential from obtaining the equitable remedy of rescission. In 
addition to authorities cited in Appellant's Brief at p. 49, see 
also Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 
1976); Woodtek, Inc. v. Musulin, 503 P.2d 677 (Or. 1972); LaBar 
v. Lindstrom, 197 N.W. 756 (Minn. 1924). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants have failed to demonstrate that there is no 
material issue of fact and that a jury could not possibly find 
for the plaintiff. Therefore, plaintiff requests that the order 
of summary judgment be reversed and that the case be remanded for 
trial. 
Dated this ff-/^ day of December, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
BV - ^ w ^ ^ - ^ a ^ K N -
Dan S. Bushnell 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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